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Kajian ini melihat motif utama penubuhan jawatankiiasa audit di 
kulangan syarikat tersenarai di Malaysia. Tujuan utama kajian ini 
ialah untuk membantii memberi penjelasan kepada penemuan yang 
tidak tekal bagi kajian yang melibatkan keberkesanan jawatankuasa 
audit di Malaysia sebelum ini. Sebiiah soal selidik yang terdiri dari 
dua belas perkara yang bertujtian tintuk melihat motif utuma 
penubuhan jawatankuasa audit telah diedar kepada juruaudit dalaman 
syaraikat yang dikenalpasti secara rawak dari kcrlangan syarikat yang 
tersenarai di Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur. Analisis menunjukkan motif 
utama penubuhan jawatankuasa audit ialah tintuk mematuhi keperluan 
penyenaraian di BSKL. Dengm motifyang sedemikian, keberkesanan 
jawatankuasa audit adalah diragui dan ini mungkin menjelaskan 
kepada penemuan yang tidak tekal untuk kajian melibatkm 
keberkesanan jawatankuasa audit di Malaysia sebelum ini. Bukti ini 
juga menyokong penemuan kajian oleh Al-Murisi et al. (1997) yang 
mendapati bahawa majoriti syarikat yang tersenarai menubuhkan 
jawatankuasa audit ketika tarikh akhir yang ditetapkan oleh BSKL 
stidah hampir. 
Introduction 
The formation of audit committees by listed companies has been mandated 
since August 1, 1993 (Section 15A of the KLSE Listing Requirements). The 
Malaysian Securities Commission (the SC) issued the Report on Corporate 
Governance in 1999 attempting to improve the corporate governance in 
Malaysian public companies. The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
was subsequently published in 2001 which was imposed by KLSE on listed 
companies through its revamped Listing Requirements (200 1). With regard to 
rules and regulations about audit committees, Malaysian regulatory bodies have 
been seen as proactive and forward looking. The question is whether listed 
Companies move in tandem with the market expectation. 
Research evidence has shown that audit committee effectiveness in 
Malaysia is inconclusive (Shamsul Nahar and Al-Murisi, 1997; Shamsul Nahar 
and Nor-Izah, 1997; Shamsul Nahar, 1998 and Shamsul Nahar and Nor-Izah, 
1999). Evidence also showed that the majority of KLSE listed companies 
formed audit committees towards the deadline set by the KLSE, i.e. 1 August 
1994 (Al-Murisi, Adika, Iskandar and Valida, 1997). This evidence may suggest 
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that audit committees had been established for the purpose of satisfying the 
USE listing requirements rather than to improve the corporate governance 
structure in the firms. Consequently, this might have contributed to the 
inconclusive findings on audit committee effectiveness. 
The inconclusive findings may also be attributed to the fact that audit 
committees in Malaysia are a relatively new phenomenon. It could therefore be 
argued that audit committees are not yet fully operational as members are 
perceived to need about 3-5 years to obtain the needed experience 
(Abdolmohammadi and Levy, 1992). Thus, i t  is premature to conclude that 
audit committees in Malaysia are not effective. However, the firms’ primary 
motive of forming audit committees could help explain the ’inconclusive 
findings. The reason why this question is of interest is that the primary motive 
for establishing audit committees is predicted to have a significant influence on 
the effectiveness of the firm’s board of directors in the financial reporting 
aspects. Had the primary motive for establishing an audit committee was to 
improve the financial reporting process, we would expect the audit committee to 
be effective. Furthermore, if audit committees were shown to have been formed 
to improve the corporate governance system with respect to the financial 
reporting aspects, the argument whereby audit committees are still at their 
infancy stage may be valid. Hence, audit committees are expected to be 
effective in the future when they become matured. On the other hand, if the 
audit committee was established for the purpose of satisfying the Listing 
Requirements, i t  is envisaged that it  will be less effective as i t  may not get the 
necessary support from the top- 
The paper is structured as follow. First, a literature review will be 
presented, which is followed by a section on methodology. Subsequently, a 
section covering results and discussion will follow. Finally, the conclusion and 
the limitations of the study are offered. 
Literature Review 
The formation of an audit committee has been perceived to “ ... provide an 
oversight function and to act as a liason between the board of directors and the 
external and internal auditors.” (Rezaee and Farmer, 1994, p. 10). In the 
Malaysian scene, audit committees are relatively a new phenomena and they 
“. . . are not, however, a widespread practice in Malaysia.” (Vanasco, 1994, p. 
23) compared to those in more developed markets. In the US for instance, audit 
committees have become part of the corporate governance system since the 
early 1940s, following the stock market crash in the US in 1939. In UK, the 
issue of audit committees had been a popular issue well before publication of 
the Cadbury report (1992). However, in spite of the popularity, mandatory audit 
committee requirements have mainly been achieved through the respective 
country’s stock exchanges and not through the respective country’s Companies 
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Act. For instance, both the New York Stock Exchange (in 1978) and the 
London Stock Exchange (in 1993) have mandated all companies listed on the 
exchanges to form audit committees. In Asia, Singapore has taken the lead on 
this issue where in 1989 i t  required all companies listed on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange to establish audit committees as stipulated in  the Singapore 
Companies Act. 
The popularity of audit committees has been mainly been due to their 
perceived ability to oversee and thus improve the corporate financial reporting 
process (Treadway Commission, 1987; Cadbury, 1992; and Buckley, 1979). In 
fact audit committees have been argued to be able to reduce the likelihood of 
the incidence of frauds in the financial reporting process. This perception 
mainly lies on the premise that audit committees are argued to be independent 
of the management and therefore they are expected to be able to oversee the 
financial reporting process more objectively. This is achieved because audit 
committees are expected to ensure that the financial statements reflect the ”true” 
and “fair” view about the firm (e.g., Azham, 1990). In their paper, Simnett, 
Green and Roebuck (1993) surveyed an accounting literature and concluded that 
among the major benefits of audit committees were: to improve the quality of 
the financial reporting process, to assist the external and internal auditors’ 
independence and to improve the users’ confidence in the financial statements. 
In fact, evidence also showed that audit committees improve the information 
content of earnings among the US companies (Wild, 1994). 
Among Malaysian companies, audit committees have been argued to 
become part of the corporate governance system since the issuance of 
BNIWGPI in 1985, which was issued following the collapse of the Bumiputra 
Finance Berhad (Al-Murisi, Ayoib and Chek, 1995). The B W G P l  required 
all finance companies under BNM jurisdiction to form audit committees, the 
majority of which are non-executive directors. The requirement was later 
extended to insurance companies through JPYGP 1 (Bank Negara Malaysia, 
1992). The U S E ,  in response to the public concern about the quality of 
corporate financial reporting process, issued Section 15A (and Section 344A) 
which required all listed companies to form audit committees with 1 August 
1994 being the latest date granted. 
Studies investigating audit committees in Malaysia, nonetheless, found 
that audit committees were generally ineffective. Shamsul Nahar and Al- 
Murisi (1997), for instance, showed that having accountant(s) on an audit 
committee was found to influence audit committee effectiveness. Other 
variables in the studies, namely, the number of years an audit committee has 
been in place and the extent of outside directors making up the committee, did 
not influence audit committee effectiveness. 
In a subsequent investigation, Shamsul Nahar and Nor-Izah (1999) 
extended the study by Shamsul Nahar and AI-Murisi (1997) by including other 
variables into the analysis, namely the status of the audit committee chairman, 
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the size of the firm and the leadership structure. The study, however, failed to 
replicate the findings by Shamsul Nahar and Al-Murisi (1997). Rather, the 
study showed that firm’s size adversely influenced the effectiveness of an 
audit committee. Both papers argued that the insignificant findings of audit 
committee effectiveness could have been due to their being at the infancy 
stage. Thus, i t  was argued that, given ample time, audit committees would 
eventually be effective in carrying out their duties. 
Several studies have also investigated the motives for forming audit 
committees. Nonetheless, the evidence, which was primarily derived in more 
developed markets, is inconclusive. Two contrasting reasons for audit 
committee establishment are offered. On the one hand, audit codmittees are 
argued to have been formed as a result of the principal-agent issue. Evidence 
supporting this contention is, for instance, documented by Pincus, Rusbarsky 
and Wong (1993). The issue of principal-agent arises due to the separation 
between ownership and control, which gave rise to the agency costs (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The agency problem exacerbates within larger firms as 
opposed to smaller firms (Keasey and Wright, 1993) which is contributed by 
the dispersion of ownership. The separation between ownership and control 
leads to information asymmetry as owners in today’s world hold only partial 
interests and therefore their access to the day-to-day operation of the firm is 
limited. Therefore, financial statements are issued to provide the owners with 
information about the firm and thus to alleviate the information asymmetry 
(Whittington, 1993). On the other hand, evidence which argued that directors’ 
incentives led to audit committee establishment was also available (Bradbury, 
1990). According to the proponent of this argument, audit committees are 
formed to assist the outside director of the boards to gain more information 
about the firm’s financial reporting practice. Outside directors, i t  is argued, 
being outside of the firm, are not able to get access to the inside information 
easily and thus, rely on the service of audit committee members. 
An earlier study by Eichenseher and Shields (1985) showed that there was 
a positive and strong relation between the presence of audit committees and 
the engagement of big-eight auditors. Thus, the findings could therefore be 
interpreted that big-eight auditors contributed to the formation of audit 
committees which was argued further to increase auditors’ independence and 
the reliability of the audited financial statements. Subsequent evidence in the 
UK also suggests that audit committees were formed as a result of the 
presence of high agency costs (Collier, 1993b). However, an earlier study by 
Bradbury among US companies showed that directors’ incentives played 
major roles in determining audit committee formation rather than the agency 
cost incentives. 
In another study, Pincus et al. (1989) argued and showed evidence 
supporting the existence of audit committees which were consistent with the 
agency-theoretic framework. Nonetheless, their evidence failed to show that 
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big-eight auditors led to the establishment of audit committees, as found in 
Eichenseher and Shield’s (1985) study. Therefore, it seems that the incentives 
to form audit committees are not universal, rather i t  can therefore be argued 
that audit committees are formed to serve the need peculiar to the respective 
firms. Nonetheless, the majority of the top 250 companies in the UK have 
audit committees in their companies (Collier, 1993a) and so do the US 
companies (Mautz and Nuemann, 1972 and 1977). Thus, having an audit 
committee is more associated with following the “norm’ rather than to really 
utilize i t  for the benefit of the firm. 
Perhaps, the inconsistency in the motives to form audit committees had 
also led to the inconsistency in the findings on audit committee effectiveness 
among the developed markets. Crawford (1987), for instance, found that the 
presence of audit committees was not found to be associated with better 
financial reporting. The study by Kalbers (1992) also did not show evidence 
that audit committees were effective. Rather, Kalbers showed that external 
auditors perceived that audit committees were not effective in  that they were 
deficient, among others, in the aspects of responsibilities and knowledge. In 
another related study among the UK companies, Al-Murisi also failed to 
document evidence supporting audit committee effectiveness (1995). 
Nonetheless, studies which investigated the roles of certain attributes of 
audit committee members showed that, among others, audit committee 
independence, knowledge in accounting and law and the average tenure of 
members found that they were related favourably with a firm’s financial 
reporting process (e.g., Kollin et al., 1991; McMullen, 1993 and Cobb, 1993). 
In fact in an earlier paper, Jemison and Oakley (1983) argued that the key 
element in a corporate governance system is to have an active audit committee 
which consisted solely of outside directors. 
Audit committees are also argued to have been formed for the purpose of 
window-dressing (Menon and William, 1994). Companies with audit 
committees are perceived by the markets to be committed to improving the 
corporate governance system and to protecting the interests of the 
shareholders. However, in reality, audit committees of these companies are not 
fully operational up to the expectation and, in fact, the findings by Menon and 
Williams on the determinants of audit committee reliance were mixed. 
Nevertheless, the prevailing effects of window-dressing motive might have 
driven the inconclusive findings on the studies with regard to audit 
committees. This will result in audit committee ineptness, which is predicted 
to be more serious in the environment where its formation is mandatory. 
Methodology 
In order to solicit the motives to establish audit committees among Malaysian 
listed companies, twelve variables were identified. The twelve variables are 
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listed in the Appendix for reference and the symbols used to represent each of 
the variables in the subsequent analysis and discussion. Each of the 
respondents was asked to respond to the question “To what extent do you 
agree that the following are reasons for your organisation to have an audit 
committee”. The respondents would then select the most appropriate number 
on the scale of “1” (strongly disagree) to “5” (strongly agree) to represent their 
answers to the above question. 
The twelve variables were designed on the basis that audit committees 
were formed to assist the board of directors to discharge its duties, improve 
external auditor’s independence, increase public confidence in the financial 
statements and to satisfy the KLSE requirements. 
The population for the present study comprised companies listed on the 
KLSE as at 31 December 1995, which totalled 529 companies. The 529 
companies were then classified according to the KLSE Sector Classification. 
Subsequently, the companies in each sector were arranged alphabetically and a 
sample was drawn by selecting the first company in every three. This process 
resulted in a total of 181 companies, representing about thirty-five percent of 
the population. 
A cover letter together with a set of questionnaire and a reply-paid 
envelope was sent to each group internal auditor of the respective sample 
companies. The internal auditors were selected as respondents because they 
are expected to work very closely with the firm’s audit committee. Moreover, 
internal auditors are predicted to be involved heavily during the formation 
stage of audit committees. As a result, they are expected to be able to evaluate 
the primary motive of audit Committees’ formation in their firms. 
To determine the primary motive to establish an audit committee, the 
mean for each of the twelve items was computed and ranked in a descending 
order. From the ranking, the study would be able to determine w iether audit 
committees were formed primarily to promote a good corporate governance 
system or to merely satisfy the KLSE requirements. Subsequen ly, a factor 
analysis was carried out to reduce the twelve items into more meaningful 
factors. 
/ 
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majority of the companies formed audit committees in 1994. Table 1 presents 
the descriptive statistics of the twelve variables which attempted to gauge the 
reasons for establishing audit committees. 
Results And Discussion 
Out of a total of 18 1 questionnaires sent to the sample firms’ internal auditors, 
forty five were returned which represented a twenty-five percent response rate. 
However, only forty three responses were finally used in the analysis as the 
other two were considered incomplete. The majority of the respondents (i.e., 
82.5 percent) were KLSE Main Board listed companies. Sixty percent of the 
respondents indicated that audit committees had been existent in their firms for 
1-3 years. Another 32.5 percent indicated that audit committees had been 
existent in their firms for more than 3 years. This evidence suggested that 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics (N=43) 
Variables Min Max Mean Rank Std. dev 
v1 1 5 4.30 2 0.9 1 
v 2  1 5 4.14 3 1.10 
v 3  1 5 3.81 8 1.01 
v 4  1 5 3.70 9 0.99 
v 5  1 5 3.44 12 1.16 
V6 1 5 3.47 11 1.08 
v 7  1 5 3.83 6 1.09 
V8 1 5 3.74 7 1.18 
v 9  1 5 3.67 10 0.99 
VIO 1 5 3.84 5 1.02 
v11 1 5 4.00 4 1.02 
v12 1 5 4.34 1 0.89 
Results in Table 1 suggest that the primary objective to form an audit 
committee was to satisfy the KLSE requirements (V12) (i.e., with the highest 
mean of 4.34). On the other hand, the lowest mean score (i.e., 3.44) was item 
V5 (i.e., to preserve and enhance the external auditor independence). V6 
received the second lowest score, which downplayed the important roles of 
audit committee in establishing an avenue for an effective communication 
between the board and external auditors. This evidence seems to contradict the 
contention whereby among the purposes of forming audit committees were to 
promote better a financial reporting environment as auditor’s independence (as 
measured by V5) is a very important indicator of audit quality. It has been 
argued and shown that audit quality has significant bearing on quality of 
accounting data published in a firm’s financial statements (Teoh and Wong, 
1993). It has also been argued that the evolution of audit committees was 
attributed to the desire to provide an effective communication between the 
boards of directors and the external auditors which led to the voluntary 
formation of audit committees by some companies (Birkett, 1986). Evidence 
by Pincus et. a1 (1989) showed that big-eight audit firms lead to voluntary 
audit committee formation which was argued as auditor’s incentives to 
preserve independence. Thus, the findings in the present study did not reflect 
the existence of such a tendency in Malaysia. Item V1, which asked on good 
corporate practice, received the second highest score. This suggests that the 
formation of an audit committee was perceived as a good corporate practice. 
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However, this variable does not indicate anything about the specific objective 
of an audit committee as V12 does. Thus, even though V1 comes second in the 
ranking, it is not a indication of a voluntary motive for establishing an audit 
committee. 
V2 received the third highest score. This finding is consistent with the role 
of an audit committee which is to help ensure internal auditor’s independence. 
Internal auditor is an important element in internal financial reporting process 
who would identify any weaknesses and irregularities in the internal control 
system. This was supported by the ranking of V l  1 was next to V2. 
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The twelve variables could be partitioned into several meaningful factors 
(or components). The grouping would make interpretation of the variables 
become easier. Thus, factor analysis was carried out. Perhaps, the findings this 
analysis could help future researcher to carry out further research on this issue. 
To this end, a factor analysis was conducted. As a preliminary analysis, the 
Pearson correlation analysis was performed and the results are shown in Table 
2. 
The table indicates that most of the items had a strong correlation with 
one another, except for item V12, which had negative correlation coefficients 
with almost all of the other items. Hence, the correlation coefficients suggest 
that at least one factor could be extracted from the data with item V12 not 
belonging to a common factor with the other items. The Barlett’s test was 
found to be large (344.162) and it  was significant at one percent level. This 
statistics therefore justifies the use of the factor model in the analysis. The 
justification for using factor analysis is further supported by the Kaiser-Meyer- 
Olkin (KMO) test value, which is 0.799 which suggests that the variables have 
high mu1 ticollineari ty level. 
Results in Table 2 suggest that eleven variables (Vl -Vl l )  were correlated 
to each other at very significant level (i.e. at 3 percent level). V12, on the other 
hand, was negatively correlated with majority of the other variables (Vl-V1 1). 
Nonetheless, the negative correlation coefficients are not statistically 
significant. One explanation for the negative correlation between V12 and the 
other variables is attributed to the fact that it asks the mandatory part of an 
audit committee establishment while the other variables ask on the perceived 
voluntary motives of establishing an audit committee. Thus, the nature of 
being a mandatory motive and a voluntary motive results in the negative 
associations. 
I 
Table 2: 
Correlation Matrix (N=43)  
V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 
V1 1.00 .715 .348 .314 ,410 .483 .598 .516 .373 ,564 .509 -.I01 
v 2  
v 3  
v 4  
v5 
V6 
V7 
V8 
v 9  
v10 
v11 
v12 
(.OO) (.01) (.02) (.OO) 
1.00 .625 .542 .621 
(.OO) (.OO) (.OO) 
1.00 .684 .480 
(.OO) (.OO) 
1.00 .513 
(.OO) 
1 .oo 
(.OO) (.26) 
.783 -.196 
(.OO) (.106) 
SO9 .1 17 
(.OO) (.228) 
.447 .030 
(.OO) (.425) 
.561 -.096 
(.OO) (.27) 
.497 -.004 
(.OO) (.49) 
(.OO) (.18) 
.573 -.036 
.658 -.145 
(.OO) (.40) 
.562 -.015 
(.OO) (.46) 
.637 -.112 
(.OOJ (.23) 
1.00 -.140 
(.186) 
1 .oo 
* significance level in parenthesis 
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Table 3 
Principal Component Analysis (N=43)  
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Rotation S u m  of Squared 
Sauared Loadines LoadinQs 
Total 9c of Cum. Total 90 of Cum. Total 9c of Cum 
var. 90 var. % var. V O  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
6.68 55.663 
1.200 9.998 
.976 8.135 
.764 6.368 
.604 5.035 
SO9 4.238 
.438 3.653 
.347 2.889 
.197 1.638 
.131 1.090 
,0883 .736 
,0665 .554 
55.663 6.68 55.663 55.663 6.68 55.273 55..273 
65.661 1.200 9.998 65.661 1.247 10.388 65.661 
73.796 
80.164 
85.201 
89.439 
93.092 
95.98 1 
97.620 
98.7 10 
99.446 
100.00 
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Table 5 
Rotated Factor Matrix ( N = 4 3 )  Subsequently, factor extraction procedure was conducted using the 
Principal Component Analysis. The results are shown in Table 3. Two factor 
with eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted which accounted for 66 percent 
of the total variance. 
Table 4 presents the factor matrix which shows the (unrotated) factor 
loadings relating the variables to the two factors. Each of the coefficients 
indicates the weight assigned to the respective factors, i.e. factor loadings. 
High factor loadings suggest a high association of the items with the respective 
factors. ! 
Table 4 also presents the communalities for the two factors. The 
communalities in  Table 4 range from 0.547 (Vl) to 0.792 (V2) indicating that 
the common factors explain a significant portion of the total variance. 
Table 4 
Factor Matrix ( N = 4 3 )  
Items Factor 1 Factor 2 Communali ties 
v 1  .679 -.293 .547 
v 2  362 - .222 .792 
v 3  .75G .384 .7 19 
v 4  .663 .340 .554 
v 5  .797 .012 .635 
V6 .8 10 .099 .667 
v 7  263 -. 006 .749 
V8 .74 1 .063 .553 
v 9  .779 .144 .627 
v10  .796 -.115 .647 
v11 .793 -. 180 .6G 1 
v12 -.101 .847 72 8 
The factors were rotated (using varimax rotation) in order to maximise the 
loadings of some of the variables so that the interpretability of the factor is 
enhanced. The results from the rotation will make large loadings to become 
larger and small loadings to become smaller. Thus, the partition of variables 
into appropriate factors will become obvious. Results of the analysis are 
shown in (Panel A) Table 5 .  Panel B of Table 5 presents the factor 
transformation matrix. 
Panel A: Rotated Factor Matrix 
v 1  .649 -.355 
v 2  .838 -.301 
v 3  .788 .3 12 
v 4  .69 1 .277 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
v 5  .795 -.061 
V6 .816 -. 143 
v 7  .854 .0g77 
v 9  .788 .070 
V8 .744 - .005 
v10 .782 -. 188 
v11 .773 -.252 
v12 -.022 .853 
Panel B: Factor Transformation Matrix 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Factor 1 396  -.092 
Factor 2 -092 996 
The factor loadings will help determine which variables belon, 0 to which 
factor. There is no absolute rule in arriving at the variables to be included in 
which factor (Norusis, 1993). The author adopted the rule of mid-point of the 
rotated factor loadings as the cut-off point. In this case, the mid-point was 
0.414 (the lowest loading being lO.OOSl, and the highest loading being 10.854)). 
Thus, rotated factor loadings that are above the mid-point will belong to that 
factor. The outcome of applying 0.414 as the criteria for the factor 
determination is as presented in Table 6. 
Interestingly, 11 variables (i.e. V1-Vl 1) make Factor 1 while one variable 
(V12) makes Factor 2. Factor 1 could be signified as “Strengthening Financial 
Reporting Process” and Factor 2 could be defined as “Fulfillment of 
Mandatory Requirement”. Finally, a correlation analysis found that the 
correlation coefficient between Factor 1 and Factor 2 was 0.000 (p=l .OOO), 
which suggests that there is no association between the two factors. 
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committees were formed by a majority of the firms on the KLSE towards 1 
August 1994, the deadline set by the KLSE which is interpreted as forming 
audit committees for purpose of satisfying the requirements. Had the primary 
motive of establishing audit committees been to promote a better financial 
reporting process, the score on the motive to establish audit committee for 
purpose of U S E  Listing requirements would have been low and unimportant. 
Perhaps, the motive to form audit committees being primarily to satisfy 
the KLSE listing requirements explains the inconclusive findings in the studies 
which investigated audit committee effectiveness in Malaysia. Therefore, any 
proposal to extend the mandatory requirement of audit committee formation 
through the Companies Acts may need to be considered carefully as merely 
having audit committees to satisfy the requirements will not only mislead the 
public but also involves costs to the respective companies considering the 
benefits received, particularly for small public companies (Rezaee and Farmer, 
1994). Forming audit committees for the purpose complying the requirements 
will lead to users believing that the financial reporting process of the firm is 
good when the operations of the committee are not as expected. Thus, the 
audit committee is formed for window-dressing purpose (Menon and 
Williams, 1994). 
Table 6 
Partitioning of Variables into Factors 
Panel A: Factor 1 
Variable Description 
v 1  
v 2  
v 3  
V4 
v 5  
V6 
v 7  
V8 
V9 
v10 
v11 
To promote good corporate practice 
To promote internal auditor’s independence 
To assist directors in  discharging statutory responsibilities 
with regard to financial reporting 
To assist management to prevent frauds, irregularities and 
errors 
To promote external auditor’s independence 
To improve communication between board and the external 
auditor 
To improve communication between board and the internal 
auditor 
To serve as an arbitration between the management and 
auditors 
To increase investment analysts’ confidence in credibility 
and objectivity of financial statements 
To increase public confidence in credibility and objectivity 
of financial statements 
To report deficiencies in the control environment or the 
management weaknesses 
1 
Panel B: Factor 2 
To satisfy the KLSE Listing Requirements 
Variable Description 
v12 
Conc 1 usions 
The present study attempts to identify the dominant reason for audit committee 
establishment among Malaysian listed companies. The objective of the study 
is to determine whether the primary reason for audit committee establishment 
is attributed to fulfilling the mandatory requirements or to enhancing the 
corporate governance system, particularly with regard to a firm’s dorporate 
financial reporting process. 
The evidence showed that the dominant reason for establishing audit 
committees among Malaysian listed companies is to fulfil1 the U S E  listing 
requirements. Given this motive, it is envisaged that audit committees in 
Malaysia are less likely to be effective in discharging their duties. This finding 
supports the earlier evidence by AI-Murisi et. a1 who found that audit 
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Appendix I 
To what extent do you agree that the following are the reasons for your 
organisation to have an audit committee: 
v 1  
v2 
v 3  
v 4  
v 5  
V6 
v 7  
V8 
v 9  
v 1 0  
v11  
v12 
Good corporate practice 
Preserve and enhance the 
independence of internal auditors 
Assist the directors in 
discharging their statutory 
responsibilities with regard to 
financial reporting 
Assist the management to 
discharge its responsibilities to 
prevent fraud and other 
irregularities and errors 
Preserve and enhance the 
independence of the external 
auditor 
Improve communication between 
the board and the external auditor 
Improve communication between 
the board and the internal auditor 
Provide a forum for arbitration 
between management and 
auditors 
Increase the confidence of 
investment analysts in the 
credibility and objectivity of 
financial statements 
Increase the confidence of the 
public in the credibility and 
objectivity of financial statements 
Assist the auditor to report 
serious deficiencies in the control 
environment or management 
weaknesses 
€USE requirements 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
1 2  
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Strongly 
Agree 
4 5  
4 5  
4 5  
4 5 ’  
4 5  
4 5  
4 5  
4 5  
4 5  
4 5  
4 5  
4 5  
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